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But there are instances in which merely interpreting the law does not
dispose of the entire issue. The availability of law to a party is not always enough. There must be a real desire to use it, both in letter and
spirit. Therein lies the minor flaw in this opinion. The court acknowledges the authority of the Corps of Engineers to deny a permit for
environmental protection, but is silent as to the Corps' obligation to
use this authority even when, as here, it is apparent that public
agencies and individuals have had to force it to act.
The public has a vested interest in knowing how well its environment is being protected. If public pressure is occasionally needed
that fact should be stated, for the the court has information before it
which the public does not. People are becoming more aware of how
important their environment is to them. The right to a livable environment has become of paramount importance and has been termed
perhaps the most fundamental of all rights.5 5 The reason is simply
that a breach of an environmental right, like transforming a shore
into a landfill, is often irrevocable. This is too high a price to pay for
public unawareness. The court cannot be so ingenuous as to believe
that all governmental agencies now see the light of law and reason
36
and need no further public supervision.
Lee M. MacCracken

BELATONS Acr
LABoR-MANAGEENT
BELAnoNs-§ 301(a)
LABOR
AND Nomus-LAGuADA Acr-CoucnvE BmARA NG AGEEmmms-

No-STR= CLAusE.-A supervisor employed by petitioner Boys Markets Incorporated, with the aid of other non-union personnel, rearranged various items of merchandise in the frozen foods compartments
at one of petitioner's stores. A union representative thereupon demanded the food cases be stripped of all merchandise and be refilled
by members of respondent union local 770. When petitioner refused
to comply with this demand, a strike was called by local 770 in
violation of an arbitration agreement with petitioner that required
35

3

See Sive, supra note 23, at 643.

6 See L. JAFFE, JuDICAL CONTROL OF ADMIiISTuATION AcrIoN 580 (1965).
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all grievances to be submitted to arbitration' and prohibited any
"cessation of work, lockout, picketing or boycott."2
A temporary restraining order was issued by the California Supreme
Court after petitioners brought action to enjoin the work stoppage
and to obtain an order requiring specific performance of the arbitration agreement. The respondent labor union then removed the action
to federal district court and sought to have the restraining order dissolved. Petitioner counter-claimed with the demands asserted in the
state court, which were granted by the district court. On appeal the
Ninth Circuit reversed 3 the district court order enjoining the work
stoppage and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.4 Held: Reversed.
A federal district court acquiring jurisdiction of a labor dispute under
§ 801(a) of the Labor-Management Relations Act of 19475 is not precluded by § 4 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act6 from enjoining a strike
which is in violation of a no-strike provision of a collective bargaining
agreement requiring mandatory arbitration of grievances, provided
the injunction complies with existing principles of equity. The Boys
Markets Incorporatedv. Retail Clerk's Union Local 770, 398 U.S. 235
(1970).
1 The pertinent parts of the agreement were as follows:
A. CONTROVERSY, DISPUTE, OR DISAGREEMENT
Any and all matters of controversy, dispute or disagreement of any
kind or character existing between the parties and arising out of or
in any way involving the interpretation or application of the terms
of the Agreement ....
shall be settled and resolved by the procedures and in the manner hereinafter set forth.
C. ARBITRATION
1. Any matter not satisfactorily settled or resolved [by Adjustment
Procedure in paragraph B] shall be submitted to arbitration for
final determination upon written demand of either party ....
4. The arbitrator or board of arbitration shall be empowered to hear
and determine the matter in operation and the determination shall
be final and binding upon the parties, subject only to their rights
under law...
2The pertinent clause was as follows:
D. POWERS, LIMITATIONS AND RESERVATIONS
2. Work Stoppages. Matters subject to the procedure of this Article
shall be settled and resolved in the manner provided herein. During
the term of this Agreement, there shall be no cessation or stoppage
of work, lock-out, picketing or boycotts, except that the limitation
shall not be binding upon either party hereto if the other party refuses to perform any obligation under this Article or refuses or fails
to abide by, accept or perform a decision or award of an arbitrator
or board.
3 416 F.2d 368 (9th Cir. 1969).
4396 U.S. 1000 (1970).
5Act of June 21, 1947, 61 Stat. 156 [codified at 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1964)].
6 Act of March 23, 1932, ch. 90, § 4, 47 Stat. 70 Ecodified at 29 U.S.C. § 104
(1964)].
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AND How IT

GBEw

The labor injunction, though first used in England,7 is "America's8
distinctive contribution in the application of law to industrial strife"
Shortly after its inception the English chancellory had abandoned the
labor injunction in all but the most exceptional cases. 9 In contrast,
their American counterparts wholeheartly embraced the injunction °
as a permissible remedy which management could pervert into a
weapon 1 for deployment against the labor strife that was rapidly
proliferating in American industry during the latter part of the
nineteenth century.12 As a result labor was virtually stripped of its
power in opposing the vagaries of management, and the struggling
labor movement appeared destined for repose in a charnel house of
legal infamy unless the wholesale use of tis remedial device was
restrained in some manner. This abuse did not pass unnoticed by its
victims 18 as strike after strike was broken, not by "scabs" or economic
7See H. Mwias & E. BRowN, FRom TzE WAGNER Aar To TA-r-HART= 7-8
[hereinafter cited as M.ras & BRowN]. "In the United States a court
order to restrain strikes came first in the railway strike of 1877." Id. However,

(1950)

the validity of the date of the injunction's American appearance is a matter of
some doubt. Cf. Witte, Early American Labor Cases, 35 YALE L.J. 825, 833
(1926).
8
F. FR
IxFORTER & N. GREENE, THE LABOR INTUNOoN 53 (1930) [hereinafter cited as FAN mvrm & GREENE].
9 See C. GREGORY, A
aBOR AND nm Lw 97 (2d ed. 1958) [hereinafter cited
as GREGORY]. This fact was also pointed out on the floor of the House of Repre-

sentatives during a debate over the then pending Norris-LaGuardia Act. See 75
CONG.1 REc. 5467 (1932) (remarks of Representative Greenwood).
0 In America the injunction was more often tempered by the economic
predelictions of a conservative judiciary than by equitable principles of law, in
that only the most nominal demonstration of actual or threatened harm (in some
instances to such unintelligible concepts as intangible property) were required
of those who sought the protection of the injunction. See FrxFtEma & GRiE
64; GREGORY 95-104; Comment, Labor Injunctions and Judge-Made Law: The
Contemporary Role of Norris-LaGuardia, 70 YALE L.J. 70, 71 (1960). The
volume of these injunctions is well documented in FRANxFuRTE

& GREENE 49-

52, 231-252.
". Mr. Justice Brandeis noted there were those who believed,
... that the real motive in seeking the injunction was not ordinarily to
prevent property from being injured nor to protect the owner in its use,
but to endow property with active militant power which would make it
dominant over men. In other words, that, under the guise of protecting
property rights, the employer was seeking sovereign power. Truax v. Corrigan,
257 U.S. 312, 368 (1921) (dissenting opinion).
2

3. See F. WmTrrY, GoyErN
AND CoLLEcarvE BARcAnn
51-52 (1951)
[hereinafter cited as WHI'rEY]. See also FRANEFUmrE & GREENE.

i3Eloquent testimony to the efficacy of the injunction has been borne
by the man who was largely the occasion for its prominence. Explaining
the collapse of the famous Pullman strike, Eugene V. Debs testified 'that

the ranks were broken, and the strike was broken up . . . not by the

Army, and not by any other power, but simply and solely by the action
of the United States courts in restraining us from discharging our duties
as officers and representatives of the employees ....
F NRA.xrranR
& GREEN 17.
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depravity of the striking worker, but by the loss of public support
when a strike was continued in contempt of a lawful court order 1 4 A
popular outcry did arise against the continued abuse of the injunction
and it was not long until the Democratic party, as a means of
obtaining labor votes and demonstrating its opposition to the courts'
interference with the labor movement, adopted in the campaign of
1896 a slogan impugning "government by injunction." 15
The federal courts, far from being chastised or intimidated by
this outpouring of public sentiment, sought instead to further their
jurisdiction of labor disputes by a somewhat doubtful interpretation 6

of the mandates of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act. 17 The Supreme Court
construed this act as extending jurisdiction to the federal courts in
labor disputes without necessity of diversity of citizenship or other
jurisdictional limitations previously required.', However, these decisions did not go unnoticed in the halls of Congress, for in 1914 the
Clayton Act'9 emerged as a measure that labor believed would immunize their organizations from the indiscriminate use by the federal
courts of the nefarious labor injunction.2 0 Such hopes were soon shattered, for the Clayton Act was summarily emasculated by the judiciary
14 See WrrNEY 27, 52; Wellington & Albert, Statutory Interpretationand the
Political Process: A comment on Sinclair v. Atkinson, 72 YAr L.J. 1547, 1553

(1963).

& GREENE I.
BRowN 9 & n.19.
17 Act of July 2, 1890, ch. 690, Title VIII, 50 Stat. 693 [codified at 15
15 FANKFORTER
16 See Mniis &

U.S.C. § 31 (1964)].
18 See Gompers v. Bucks Stove, 221 U.S. 418 (1911); Lowe v. Lawlor, 208
U.S. 274 (1908) (popularly known as the Danbury Hatters case). See also
Fiui
rATnmi & GREENE 7-9; Bablitz, Labor Unions and Their Relation to the
Law in the United States, 2 Ky. L.J. 9, 12-13 [No. 7, 1914] (the author here
points out two reasons why the Sherman Act should not apply: "(1) It never
was the intention of congress to have the Sherman Anti-Trust Law apply to
labor unions. (2) There cannot be a trust in labor power; because 'the human
power to produce is the antithesis of the material commodities which become
the subject of trust control' ").
'9 Act of June 21, 1947, ch. 323, 88 Stat. 730 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1227, 44 (1964). The act in part provides:
[Tihe labor of a human being is not a commodity or article of commerce. Nothing contained in the anti-trust laws shall be construed to forbid the existence and operation of labor, agricultural or horticultural
organizations, instituted for the purpose of mutual help, and not have
capital stock or conducted for profit, or to forbid or restrain individual
members of such organizations rom lawfully carrying out the legitimate
objects thereof; nor shall organizations or the members thereof, be held
or construed to be illegal combinations or conspiracies in restraint of
trade, under the anti-trust laws. Id. at § 6, 38 Stat. 731 (1914) [codified
at 15 U.S.C. § 17 (1)(64)].
20 See FRA
TKFm=
& GRENE 7, 206; GREGoRY 159; MmLns & BRowN 9;
WrrNEY 77-81. It is noted here that Samuel Gompers, then president of the AF
of L, hailed this legislation as "Labor's Magna Carta."
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on the rationale that Congress had merely intended to state the law
as it already existed in previous judicial decisions. 21 It was not
until the passage of the Norris-LaGuardia Act in 193222 that labor
received the immunity it sought in the Clayton Act.
The Norris-LaGuardia Act was passed to correct the flagrant
abuse of labor injunctions by removing from the federal courts the
power to issue this remedy in labor disputes. 23 The history of the act
is replete with reference to the abuse of the injunction 24 that led
Congress to realize the necessity of taking the federal courts "out of
the labor injunction business." 2 5 The Act proved effective in accomplishing this purpose for the courts did not seek to escape its
prohibitions by semantical gymnastics but instead gave a broad
interpretation of the act, avoiding a repetition of the doubtful treat21 SeGREGORY 166-168; American Steel Foundries v. Tri-City Central
Trades Council, 257 U.S. 184, 203 (1921); Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering,
254 U.S. 443, 469-471 (1921). See also GREroRY 163, 167-169 (where is noted
the Court, in the Duplex case, also found that the Clayton Act applied only in
cases where the relationship of employment existed between the company and
the union members involved.); Larson, Labor Warfare and the Anti-Injunction
Laws, 29 K'Y. L.J. 412 [1941] (the author notes here that the effect of the
Duplex and Tri-City decisions was that a labor union was not a person who
could22claim protection under the Clayton Act).
Act of March 23, 1932, ch. 90, 47 Stat. 70 (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 101105 (1964)].
23No court of the United States shall have jurisdiction to issue any restraining order or temporary or permanent injunction in any case involving or growing out of any bor dispute to prohibit any person or
persons participating or interested in such dispute (as these terms are
herein defined) from doing, whether singly or in concert, any of the
following acts:
(a) Ceasing or refusing to perform any work or to remain in any relation or employment;

(e) Giving publicity to the existence of, or the facts involved in, any
labor dispute, whether by advertising, speaking, patrolling, or by any
other method not involving fraud or violence;
(f) Assembling peaceably to act or to organize to act in promotion of
their interest in a labor dispute; ....
(i) Advising, urging, or otherwise causing or inducing without fraud or
violence the acts heretofore specified .... Id. at ch. 34, 47 Stat. 70
(codified at 29 U.S.C. § 104 (1964)].
24 See generally 75 CONG. REc. 5462-5468; H. R. REP. No. 669, 72d Cong.,
1st Sess. (1932); S.REP. No. 163, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. (1932). For a discussion
of this history see, Stewart, No-Strike Clauses in the Federal Courts, 59 Micr.
L. REv. 673, 676-77 (1961); Wellington & Albert, supra note 14, at 1553-1555;
Witte, The FederalAnti-Injunction Act, 16 Meet. L. REv. 638 (1932).
[T]he Norris-LaGuardia Act was a clear cut political response to these
substantive and procedural abuses. It is a statute that reflects a "Government hands off' philosophy of labor relations, and at the time of its
enactment, government meant judicial intrusion through injunctive decree. Wellington & Albert, supra at 1555.
25 Marine Cooks v. Panama S.S. Co., 362 U.S. 365, 369 (1960).
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ment accorded the Clayton Act.28 This long delayed response was followed by other meaningful reforms, one of which is fundamental to
the decision in the case at hand.
OuR STORY BEGINs

The Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947 [hereinafter
LMRA] 27 was directed at amending the Norris-LaGuardia Act through
the enactment of provisions that imposed extensive restrictions on
the actions of labor unions. 28 In the interim between the passage of
Norris-LaGuardia and the LMRA, the labor unions, unfettered by the
restrictive labor injunction in the federal courts and because of other
exogenous factors, had rapidly expanded, gaining such power that
control was necessary to protect management and the public from
dominance by over-demanding labor unions. 29 The LMRA was de-

signed to provide such protection and restore the balance in labor
relations by various methods including creating some exceptions to
the Norris-LaGuardia Act.8 0
Section 801(a) of the LMRA, 81 in giving federal courts jurisdiction

in labor disputes involving a collective bargaining agreement,3 2
raised the question of whether the federal courts would be empowered
to issue labor injunctions in these disputes or whether § 4 of the NorrisLaGuardia Act remained a bar to such injunction. Section 801(a) was
not expressly placed beyond the reach of § 4 of Norris-LaGuardia.
Thus, the problem arose as to whether Congress intended a repeal of
26Se generally Marine Cooks v. Panama S.S. Co., 362 U.S. 365, 369
(1960); United States v. Hutchison, 812 U.S. 219, 284 (1941); Milk Wagon
Drivers Union v. Lake Valley, 811 U.S. 91, 101-103 (1940); New Negro Alliance
v. Grocery Co., 303 U.S. 552, 562-63 (1938); Lauf v. E.G. Shinner & Co., 303
U.S. 323, 329 (1938).
2729 U.S.C. § 141-44, 151-58, 159-67, 176-82, 185-87 (1964) (sometimes
referred
2 8 to as the Taft-Hartley Act).
29

See MTTi.s & BROWN 89.

See Mn.us & BROwN 271-274; WnrNEY 617; Richardson, The Taft-Hartle
Act- Punishment or Progress, 42 Ky. L.J. 27 (1953); Wellington, The No-Strike
Clause and the Labor Injunction; Time For a Re-Examination, 30 U. Prrr. L.
REv. 293, 294 (1968); Comment, The Labor Management Relations Act and
of the Labor Injunction, 48 CoLum. L. REv. 759 (1948).
the Revival
30
See PnvIm OF LABOR RELATrONS 42-54.
31 Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor

organization representing employees in an industry affecting commerce
as defined in this chapter, or between any such labor organizations, may
be brought in any district court of the United States having jurisdiction
of the parties, without respect to the amount in controversy or without
regard
to the citizenship of the parties. 29 U.S.C. § 185 (a) (1964).
3
2 Which was exactly what the judicary had sought in construing the
Sherman Anti-Trust Act to apply to labor organizations. Cf. FRANuRTER &
GREENE 5-9.

1971]

CoMa~wrs

§ 4 of Norris-LaGuardia in a § 301 (a) collective bargaining agreement dispute.
This question of accommodating § 801(a) of the LMRA and § 4
of the Norris-LaGuardia Act was encountered in Sinclair v. Atkinson,33
a decision overruled by Boys Markets. In Sinclair, as in Boys Markets,
there was a collective bargaining agreement with a no-strike clause
and both cases involved the same question as to whether § 301(a)
impliedly repealed § 4 of the pre-existing Norris-LaGuardia Act.
The court in Sinclair held 34 that Sinclair's prayer for relief was
squarely opposed by the literal proscriptions of Norris-LaGuardia.3 5
The Court did not rest its decision merely on a literal interpretation
of that act, for the Court then delved into the legislative history of §
301(a) and its attending provisions, finding and stating in unequivocal
language 36 that Congress had not intended, impliedly or otherwise, to
repeal Norris-LaGuardia's restrictions on § 301(a).37
3370
U.S. 195 (1962).
3
4 The Court rejected the initial contention of management that controversies of this nature were not labor disputes within the meaning of § 13 of
Norris-LaGuardia. 370 U.S. 195, 199 (1962). Legal commentators have pointed
out that Norris-LaGuardia was a legislative scheme to further arbitration and
that its restrictions should not be considered to hamper the very policy its passage sought to further. See Stewart, supra note 24, at 677-678; Comment, Labor
Law: Norris-LaGuardia Bars Specific Enforcement of No-Strike Clause, 47
MINN. L. REV. 643, See also Bishin, The Law Finders: An Essay in Statutory
Interpretaon, 38 S. CAL. L. 1xv. 1, 4-5 (1965); Gregory, The Law of the
Collective Agreement, 57 MIC. L. REv. 635, 645-646 n.89 (1959) (this footnote is noted in Sinclair, 370 U.S. at 202 n.12).
35370 U.S. 195, 204-205 (1962).
36
When the inquiry is carried beyond the anguage of § 301 into its
legislative history, whatever small doubts as to the congressional purpose
could have survived consideration of the bare language of the section
should be wholly dissipated. For the legislative history of § 301 shows
that Congress actually considered the advisability of repealing the
Norris-LaGuardia Act insofar as suits based upon breach of collective
.bargaining agreements are concerned and deliberately chose not to do
so. Id. at 205.
37 The Sinclair Court noted that Congress had actually considered placing
§ 301 beyond the reach of § 4 of Norris-LaGuardia for the original bill that
passed the House of Representatives [H.R. 3020, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947)]
*idexempt disputes involving violation of labor agreements from § 4, while the
Senate version [S. 1126, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947)] did not provide for such
a repeal. Instead the Senate version made a breach of a collective bargaining
agreement an unfair labor practice enjoinable by the National Labor Relations
Board (but not in suits by private parties). The conference committee in passing
on these conflicting versions dropped the provision in' the House bill expressly
repealing § 4 and the provision in the Senate bill permitting the NLRB injunctions, coming out of conference instead with the provisions of § 301 as
enacted into the law without changes in the anti-injunction proscriptions of
Norris-LaGuardia. See Sinclair v. Atkinson, 370 U.S. 195, 207-209 (1962). The
Court added additional mortar to this wall of legislative intent by pointing out
that Senator Taft, one of the authors of the LMRA, in explaining the results of
the conference to the Senate, stated: "The conferees rejected the repeal of the
(Continued on next page)
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Legislative history alone was not sufficient to decide Sinclair since

there had previously been carried into the anti-strike rule, exceptions
resting on the policies inherent in other acts of Congress.3 8 One such
instance noted in Sinclair was a provision in the Railway Labor Act3 9
that created an adjustment board for minor grievances in the event

the parties could not settle their differences by negotiation. The Court
had found in Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen. v. Chicago River &
Indiana Railroad that an injunction preventing a union from striking
while disputes were pending before the board was not prescribed by

Norris-LaGuardia. 41 However, the Court in Sinclarrefused to find that
Chicago River was an accomodation with Norris-LaGuardia since the
Railway Labor Act placed an affirmative duty on the union to mediate,
while in Sinclair the contractual relationship alone placed the affirmative duty on the parties.

42

A perhaps more imposing argument than accommodation was also

proffered by petitioners in Sinclairbased on Textile Workers v. Lincoln
(Footnote continued from preceding page)

Norris-LaGuardia Act." Id. at 208 [for the text of Senator Taft's remarks see 93
CONG. REc. 6445-6446 (1947)].
Certainly this evidence was damning enough that further corroboration
would result only in mere surplusage, but the Court, perhaps foreseeing the attacks upon their decision [see, e.g., Aaron, Strikes in Breach of Collective Agreements: Some Unanswered Questions, 63 CoLum. L. REv.1027 (1963); Aaron,
The Labor Injunction Reappraised, 10 U.C.L.A. L. Ruv. 1027 (1963); Bishin,
supra note 34; Wellington, supra note 29; Comment, Strikes And Boycotts Section
4 of the Norris-LaGuardiaAct held to Prohibit Federal Court Injunctions of
Strikes over an Arbitrable Grievance,U. PN. L. REv. 247 (1962)], did offer such
evidence by noting other provisions of the LMRA were expressly placed beyond
the reach of Norris-LaGuardia. See, e.g., Act of June 21, 1947, § 5208 (b), 61
Stat. 146, 155 [codified as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 160 (h), 178 (b) (1964)];
Act of June 21, 1947, § 302 (e), 61 Stat. 157 [codified at 29 U.S.C. § 186 (e)
(1964)].
For further discussion of the Court's interpretation of this legislative history
see Comment, 47 MINN. L. R:v., supra note 34, at 647-650.
38 See, e.g., United States v. Hutchison, 312 U.S. 219 (1941). For a
brief comparison of this case with Sinclair see Aaron, supra note 37, at 1027-29.
Accommodation of Norris-LaGuardia with other statutes is well treated in Comment, Accommodation of the Norris-LaGuardiaAct to Other Federal Statutes,
72 HARv. L. REv. 354 (1958).
39 Act of May 20, 1926, ch. 347, 44 Stat. 577 [codified at 15 U.S.C. § 5321;
18 U.S.C. § 373; 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291-1294; 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-163, 181-188 (1964)].
40353 U.S. 30 (1957).
41
'We hold that the Norris-LaGuardia Act cannot be read alone in matters
dealing with railway labor disputes. There must be an accommodation of that
statute and the Railway Labor Act so that the obvious purpose in the enactment
of each is preserved." 353 U.S. at 40. Accord, Bhd. of R.R. Trainmen v. Howard,
343 U.S. 768 (1952); Graham v. Bhd. of Locomotive Firemen, 338 U.S. 232
(1949); Steele v. L&N R.R., 323 U.S. 192, (1944); Virginia Ry. v. Federation,
300 U.S. 515 (1937).
42 The Court also noted that the legislative history of the acts were different since the advisability of excluding § 301 was actually considered by
Congress, while such was not the case with the Railway Labor Act. See 370 U.S.
at 210-211. But see Sinclair v. Atkinson, 370 U.S. 195, 217-225 (1962) (Brennan, Douglas & Harlan, JJ., dissenting).
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Mills43 where the Court had required an employer to arbitrate after
he had refused to comply with an agreement requiring such arbitration. The Court in Lincoln Mills found a congressional policy in the
favor of enforcement of agreements to arbitrate. 44 While noting that
a literal reading of Norris-LaGuardia could bring such an action
within the terms of that act, 45 the Court in Lincoln Mills refused to
restrict § 801(a) to damage suits, finding that the section was substantive in nature and not merely procedural, which would mean
"that the agreement to arbitrate should be specifically enforced." 46
This would result in the parties being required to submit the grievance
to arbitration. Thus the Court in Lincoln Mills found that specific
enforcement of the agreement to arbitrate was not barred by NorrisLaGuardia. However, the Sinclair Court balked at extending Lincoln
Mills to permit the injunction of work stoppages in violation of a nostrike arbitration agreement pointing out that Lincoln Mills did not
which were specifically proenjoin any one of the kinds of conduct
47
hibited by the Norris-LaGuardia Act.
Nor could the Court in Sinclair find the Steelworkers Trilogy48 to
be a basis for excluding enforcement of a no-strike clause from the
commands of Norris-LaGuardia. These cases precluded the courts
from examining an arbitrator's findings by restricting judicial review
to those matters not the subject of the arbitration agreement 9 because
50
arbitration was deemed to be the "kingpin" of federal labor policy.
Petitioners in Sinclair argued that this arbitration policy could be
implemented only by enjoining work stoppages in violation of nostrike, mandatory arbitration clauses since such provisions made the
bargaining process an effective one. The Court in Sinclair was not
receptive to this argument, holding once again that the legislative
history of § 801(a) was not in agreement with such an interpretation. 51
43 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
44 In speaking of the legislative history of § 301 the Court stated:
Plainly the agreement to arbitrate grievance disputes is the quid pro quo

for an agreement not to strike. Viewed in this light, this legislation does

more than confer jurisdiction in the federal courts over labor organiza-

tions. It expresses a federal policy that federal courts should enforce
these agreements on behalf of or against labor organizations and that
industrial peace can be best obtained only in that way. Id. at 455.
45 Id. at 458.
4 Id.at 451.
47 Sinclair v. Atkinson, 370 U.S. at 212.
48 United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960); United
Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United Steelworkers
v. American Mfg. Co., 36 U.S. 564 (1960).
49 363 U.S. at 567, 568, 582, 599.
5 See Sinclair v. Atkinson, 370 U.S. 195, 213 (1962). For a further discussion of the Steelworkers Trilogy, see Mayer, Labor Relations, 1961: The

Steelworkers Case Re-examined, 13 LAB. L.J. 213 (1962).
51 Sinclair v. Atkinson, 370 U.S. at 213.
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Sinclair v. Atkinson thus found that the clear mandates of NorrisLaGuardia read in light of § 301(a) and its legislative history precluded the federal courts from enjoining the violation of a no-strike
clause.
Tm PLOT THICKENS

During the term Sinclair was decided, the Supreme Court held
in Dowd Box v. Courtney52 that § 301(a) did not divest the state
courts of jurisdiction in a suit for violation of a contract between an
employer and a labor organization. This jurisdiction was not to be
mutually exclusive for in Teamsters Local 174 v. Lucas Flour Company53 the Court, concluding that in enacting § 801(a) Congress
intended the doctrines of federal labor law to prevail over inconsistent
local rules, 54 held that state courts must apply federal substantive
labor law. However, since Norris-LaGuardia regulated only the
federal courts, the question naturally arose as to whether the state
courts would be subject to Sinclairs restriction on injunctions in ap-

plying federal substantive law to cases where violation of a labor
contract is in issue. The state courts have uniformly held that neither
Norris-LaGuardia nor Sinclair would preclude a state court from issuing an injunction to enforce a no-strike clause. 55 The result of these
state court decisions was that where an employer brought suit over a
collective bargaining agreement in state court, the union would re-

move the action to the federal district court in order to escape the
unfettered equity powers of the state court. In Avco v. Aero Lodge
73555 the Supreme Court found removal under these circumstances
to be permissible even though the employer would be denied his injunctive remedy by such removal. 57 Thus, the effect of the aforementioned decisions on labor litigation apparently was that where a
52368 U.S. 502 (1962). See also Smith v. Evening News Ass'n, 371 U.S.

195 (1962).
53 369 U.S. 95 (1962).
54 Id.
55

at 95.

The leading case was a California opinion by Chief Judge Traynor in Mc-

Carroll v. Los Angeles County Carpenters, 315 P.2d 322, 332 (Cal. 1957), cert.
denied, 355 U.S. 932 (1958). Accord, American Device Mfg. Co. v. Intl Assn
of Mach., 244 N.E.2d 862 (Ill. 1969); Armco Steel Corp. v. Perkins, 411 S.W.2d
935 (Ky. 1967); Rust Eng'r Co. v. United Bhd. of Carpenters, 210 So.2d 154
(La. 1968); Masonite Corp. v. Int'l Woodworkers, 215 So. 2d 691 (Miss. 1968);
C.D. Perry & Sons Inc. v. Robilotto, 240 N.Y.S.2d 331, 39 Misc. 2d 147 (1963);
Shaw Electric Co. v. IBEW, 208 A.2d 769 (Pa. 1965); cf. United Electrical
Workers v. Westinghouse Corp., 65 F. Supp. 420 (E.D. Pa. 1946).

56390 U.S. 557 (1968).

57 However, the Court sidestepped the question as to whether a federal court
could dissolve a state injunction issued before removal under § 301(a). See 390
U.S. at 561 n.4. But of. General Electric Co. v. Local 191, 413 F.2d 964, 966

(5th Cir. 1969).
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union had entered into a collective bargaining agreementO8 and subsequently went on strike, an employer that desired to end the strike
and have the matter submitted to arbitration would bring the action
in state court to gain the advantage of the state courts ability to issue
an injunction in such actions. But the union, desiring to perpetuate
the strike, would remove the action5 9 to the federal district court
where Sinclair would preclude such an injunction.
This hodgepodge of actions was time consuming and expensive,
while their net effect was to deprive the state courts of their injunctive powers where a labor contract was in dispute.60 Perhaps this
group of decisions could be justified as an example of the courts
fulfilling their traditional roles as interpreters and not the creators of
law.6 ' Yet, even if this is so, the sublimal quality of this masterful correlation of the judicial and legislative branches of government is lost
to the polemist unless the aggrieved party is given an adequate
remedy, for equity and good conscience entitle a party to effective
recompense when he has been wronged by another. It is conceivable
that a logical solution to this quandary would be to require specific
performance of the arbitrator's findings.
Specific enforcement of an arbitrator's findings62 that a union should
return to work, after the union had violated a no-strike agreement,
58 It was held in Local 174 Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95, 104105 (1962) that an implied no-strike provision was contained in a collective
bargaining agreement, thus making arbitration agreements subject to a no-strike
provision whether agreed to or not by the parties.
59 Avco v. Aero Lodge 735, 390 U.S. 557 (1968) would permit this removal
action.
60 It was pointed out in a Senate debate that § 301(a) was not intended as
a measure that would deprive the state courts of their jurisdiction. See 92 CONG.
lc.
5708 (1946) (remarks of Senator Ferguson). But cf. Teamsters Local v.
Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95 (1962) (where the state court's jurisdiction was
restricted by requiring the state to apply federal substantive law in § 301(a)
cases61involving violation of collective bargaining agreements).
Sinclair v. Atkinson was the laboratory (and battlefield) for a study by
three legal scholars on the role courts should play in interpreting statutes. See
Bishin, supra note 34; Wellington & Albert, supra note 14.
62 In some cases, the selection of an arbitrator is no problem. The contract between the employer and the union will designate a permanent
umpire or arbitrator to handle all disputes arising under the contract.
But under the majority of contracts, a temporary or ad hoc arbitrator
must be selected for each dispute referred to arbitration.
Where a temporary arbitrator is to be used, the contracts usually
specify alternative methods of selection. If the parties are unable to
agree on an arbitrator within a specified period of time, the contract provides for designation of an arbitrator by an impartial agency. Most contracts designate either the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service or
the American Arbitration Association as the selecting agency.
Under the rules of the American Arbitration Association, the parties
may make their own selection from lists provided by the Association.
The parties may cross off names they object to, and the Association
will choose from those remaining in order of preference. If no agree(Continued on next page)
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would be in accordance with Lincoln Mil's provision for requiring the
parties to an arbitration agreement to submit to arbitration.6 3 This
remedy would also appear tQ offer a convenient solution for ameliorating the problem of providing the employer with an equitable
means for quickly ending the strike, since the arbitrator is certainly
going to find against a union that has breached a no-strike clause,
and delay could be circumvented by writing expediency into the
arbitration agreement.6 However, the courts must once again contend
with Norris-LaGuardia, as the label is not always determinative of
the nature of the claim. 0 5 Though it is true that the dispute in Sinclair
was not submitted to arbitration, the Court there nonetheless did in
effect deny specific performance of a no-strike clause. In New
Orleans Steamship Association v. General Longshore Workers,6

a

circuit court did pass on this solution and found that specific enforcement of an arbitrator's findings was not barred by the prohibitions of
Norris-LaGuardia noting that otherwise an arbitration agreement
would be a hollow right indeed.67 The Supreme Court did not resolve
this question68 before its decision in Boys Markets, but had it done so
and accepted the decision in New Orleans Steamship,it is conceivable
the necessity of overruling Sinclair could have been avoided, since the
employer would have an effectual remedy without putting the federal
courts back into the 'labor injunction business."69
(Footnote continued from preceding page)

ment can be reached on names on the lists, the Association will appoint
an arbitrator not on the lists...
The Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service also maintains a
roster of experienced and qualified arbitrators from which the parties to
a labor agreement may make their selection. Here again, the parties may
select an arbitrator by striking those to whom they object from the list
or by advising the FMCS of the order of preference among those on
the panel. PnAumE OF LAnon RELATIoNs 56-57.
63 Further, such a course would encourage the parties to remain within the
arbitration process [going to court only for the necessary enforcement sanctions
for (1) requiring the parties to arbitrate, and (2) enforcing the arbitrator's
award].
64

See Edwards & Bergmann, The Legal and Practical Remedies Available

to Employers to Enforce a Contractual "No-Strikd' Commitment, 21 LAB. L.J.
3,15 (1970).
65 Cf. Dairy Queen v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469, 477-78 (1962).
66389 F.2d 369 (5th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 893 U.S. 828 (1968); accord,
Retail Clerks Union v. Alfred M. Lewis, Inc., 327 F.2d 442 (9th Cir. 1964).
Contra, Marine Transport Lines v. Curran, 65 L.R.R.M. 2095 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
67389 F.2d at 372.

68 The Court skirted this issue in Int'l Longshoremen's Ass'n v. Philadelphia
Marine Trade Ass'n, 389 U.S. 64 (1967). However, Justice Douglas (concurring
in part and dissenting in result) would find specific enforcement of an arbitration agreement to be precluded by the Sinclair decision. Id. at 77. But cf.
Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335 (1964).
69 See Bakaly & Pepe, And After Avco, 20 Lab. L.J. 67, 74-77 (1969);
Comment, Circumventing Norris-LaGuardiawith Arbitration Clauses, 44 NoaR
DAmm LAwYER

431, 437-46 (1969).

CO~nVMr-rs
THEN CAIx Boys MAnx-rs
The decision in Boys Markets made unnecessary any subtle distinctions between specific performance of an arbitrator's award and
an injunction ending a strike in violation of a no-strike clause. It also
made moot the question whether Sinclair extended Norris-LaGuardia's
ban on injunctions to include state courts. Boys Markets was not occasioned by the discovery of debilitating new facts, nor by freshly
discovered evidence on the legislative intent behind § 301(a), but
instead by a candid admission that Sinclair frustrated rather than promoted a national labor policy, and that consistency could best be
achieved by overruling Sinclair and its attending confusion.7 0 The
Court pointed out that the practical effect of their decisions in Sinclair
and Avco v. Aero Lodge was to oust the state courts of jurisdiction in
disputes of this nature, 71 but even if theoretically the state courts retained their jurisdiction the Court noted its holding in Lucas Flour is
frustrated since a federal labor policy would be offended by disparity
of remedies in state and federal courts. 72 The Court also accepted the
argument rejected in Sinclair that accommodation of Norris-LaGuardia
is possible as was done in Chicago River.73 Boys Markets accepts the
principles of the dissenting opinion in Sinclair that would have permitted an injunction under ordinary principles of equity where a strike
is sought to be enjoined and where it is over a grievance which both
parties are contractuallybound to arbitrate.74
Mr. Justice Black, in a scoring dissent, points out what may be the
real basis of the Boys Markets decision, noting that nothing in the
history of the acts in question has changed, but only the membership
75
of the court and the personal views of one justice.
A DENouEmNT ?
The decision in Boys Markets has apparently abolished the necessity of an esoteric process for enjoining a strike in violation of a no70 The problems engendered by Sinclair are chronologically ordered and
discussed in Comment, Jurisdiction of Federal Courts to Enjoin Labor Disputes,
82 TENN. L. R-v. 264, 280-85 (1965).
71 90 S. Ct. at 1589.
72 Id. at 1590.
7a Id. at 1593. The majority also embraces the Lincoln Mills decision, extending it to the case at hand declaring that a no-strike agreement is the "quid
pro quo" for the employees' agreement to arbitrate and that any incentive to
enter into such an agreement is dissipated if there is no expeditious remedy to
enforce the obligation. Id. at 1591.
74 Id. at 1594.
75 Id. at 1595 (Justice Stewart is the court member changing his mind. Chief
Justice Burger is the new member on the Court. Justice Marshall did not participate for reasons of health).
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strike clause in a collective bargaining agreement This decision has
potentially the added effect of reducing the value of an arbitration
agreement, with a mandatory grievance adjustment or arbitration procedure, to labor unions (with or without a no-strike clause)70 since
the union is now deprived of its most obstreperous weapon. 7 In
equity and good conscience such deprivation is certainly not shocking
to the casual observer since the union agreed not to strike, but there
are other values to be considered 8 for labor relations are conducted
in an atmosphere charged with emotion and the value of the strike
may be its immediate impact even if the union must incur damage
liabilities."9 Thus, in the eyes of labor, Boys Markets may be viewed
76 See note 58 supra.
77 New militancy among workers has given rise to increasing opposition to
no-strike restrictions. The American Federation of Government Employees recently
dropped a provision in its constitution barring strikes even though federal law
prohbits government employees from striling [5 U.S.C. § 7311 (Supp. V, 1965)]
and imposes criminal sanctions on employees participating in a strike against
the government [18 U.S.C. § 1918 (3) (Supp. IV, 1965)]. For a report on the
actions of these government employees see Wall Street Journal, Aug. 10, 1970, at
1, col. 6. Nor are the government employees alone in their demands as witnessed
by the following report:
'Give us the right to cut their gutsl' shouted an angry delegate into
a microphone at the United Steelworkers' biennial convention in Atlantic
City last week. 'Give us back our dignity. Give us the right to strike
again!' That outburst, thunderously applauded by 3,500 union men,
pointed up the increasingly rebellious mood among the nation's 1,200,000 steelworkers ....
The hottest issue involves the 'no-strike clause' that has been a part of
every U.S.W. contract since 1936, and is a common feature of most other
labor agreements. It forbids any wildcat strike during the life of a contract, providing instead for binding arbitration to settle local grievances.
The clause is fundamental to the U.S.'s tenuous labor peace-in contrast
with Britain, where workers can walk out in mid-contract. If the nostrike clause is abolished, said a U.S.W. official, 'it will be just like the
old days again: work on Monday and Tuesday and strike on Wednesday, Thursday and Friday.'
Last week, however, no fewer than 1,000 resolutions from union locals
demanded an end to the no-strike clause and the slow arbitration process.
TimE, Oct. 12, 1970, at 77.
78 Courts and arbitration in the context of most commercial contracts are
resorted to because there has been a breakdown in the working relationship of the parties; such resort is the unwanted exception. But the
grievance machinery under a collective bargaining agreement is at the
very heart of the system of industrial self-government. Arbitration is the
means
of solving
the which
unforeseeable
modeling
a system
of private
for all the
problems
may arisebyand
to provide
for their
solutionlaw
in
a way which will generally accord with the variant needs and desires of
the parties. United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Nay. Co., 363 U.S.
574, 581 (1960).
79 M
do net
notmoney
occur advantage
and continue
merely,
or even mainly, to
obtain thestrikes
highest
to the
strikers.
Economists have
pointed out that many strikes have not been in the economic interest
of the strikers, citing cases, such as the General Motors strike in 194546, in which 'a union imposes on its members a loss of earnings through a
(Continued on next page)
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as permitting the employer to breach his agreements with impunity,
paying only money damages8 ° that may be of little value in restoring
the union's real or imagined losses suffered at the hands of an antagonistic employer. Of course, it would seem unfair to place such an
onus upon the employer by permitting the union to breach its agreement without providing an adequate remedy to the employer, since
he too will suffer those self-same damages that a union seeks to mollify
by striking. However, it should be remembered that the employer was
not the victim of the labor injunction and that Norris-LaGuardia was
enacted to remove from the employers the right to injunctive relief in
labor disputes."' Furthermore, if the Sinclair decision is correct, Congress had not seen fit to reinvest the employer with equitable relief
where there was a violation of a no-strike clause before Sinclair. Nor,
as the Court admits in Boys Markets has Congress demonstrated its
disfavor with the Sinclair finding by repealing the mandates of NorrisLaGuardia in cases brought under § 801(a) *82 While admitting that
arbitration seeks to remove the emotionalism of the strike and lockout from labor disputes, the arbitration machinery is not designed to
undermine the strength of the labor union. Arbitration must be viewed
as the means for providing labor with a forum for its grievances and
not as a new channel for employer dominance. 88
In retrospect, if the Court had extended Sinclair to the states and
if it had embraced the specific performance of an arbitrator's award
as a permissible remedy where a no-strike agreement is breached,
then arbitration as a national labor policy would be furthered, the
employer would be protected from a long and costly strike, and more
(Footnote continued from preceding page)

strike that cannot be made up in less than eight years of work at the

wage increases they won through the strike.' The psychological, political
and institutional factors in strikes are often much more important than
purely monetary considerations. Lester, Reflections on the "Labor
Monopoly" Issue, 55 J. PoL. EcoN. 513, 518 (1947).
s0 As counsel for respondent subsequently stated,
[F]or our part ....

we felt, and still feel, that the decision later an-

nounced [Boys Markets Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, 90 S.Ct. 1853
(1970)] creates an inequity or an imbalance between the bargaining
parties in the sense that Union violations of a bargaining agreement may
now be litigated in the Federal Courts, but employer violations remain
subject only to the arbitral proceeding without any interim injunctive
relief available. Letter from Robert M. Dohrmann (counsel for respondent Retail Clerk's Union, Local 770) September 11, 1970.
81 See Dunau, Three Problems in Labor Arbitration, 55 VA. L. Brv. 427,
465-67 (1969). But cf. Note, Labor Law-The Policies and Decisional Processes
in the Boys Markets Decision, 41 Miss. LJ. 626 (1970).
82 Bills were introduced in Congress that sought to reverse the Sinclair
decision but Congress failed to act on their passage. See S. 2132, 89th Cong.,
1st Sess.
(1965); H.R. 9059, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965).
8
3 See note 78 supra.
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importantly, the federal courts would not be back in the "labor injunction business" without the protection that an arbitrator would
afford.
Jerry Markham

